Deterrence, Diplomacy, and the Death Spiral of Leverage: Why the U.S. Bombed Iran's Nuclear Sites
Introduction: From the Cold War to Tehran
It’s been a while since I’ve written anything—not because I’ve lost interest, but because the weight of what’s happening in the world is exhausting. Still, there are moments that demand a response. The recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure are one such moment.
My background in the subject matter is not academic. I served in the U.S. Air Force and was trained in nuclear surety. I worked on support systems tied to the Minuteman III and Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), two critical components of the U.S. nuclear triad. In training, we studied not just maintenance and logistics but the moral, strategic, and geopolitical implications of nuclear weapons. We were taught that one error could result in catastrophe—not just for a mission, but for civilization.
That kind of responsibility changes the way you view the world. Nuclear weapons aren’t just about destructive power. They’re about leverage, and they’re about the fragility of peace maintained by the threat of mutual annihilation.
The Logic of MAD: How Destruction Preserves Peace
Mutually Assured Destruction, commonly abbreviated as MAD, is often dismissed as a relic of the Cold War. But the doctrine remains central to the strategic calculations of every nuclear-armed state.
MAD’s logic is brutal and elegant: if one nuclear power launches an attack, the other will respond in kind. The result? Total annihilation. Therefore, the threat of retaliation serves as the most powerful deterrent imaginable.
Critically, deterrence is not coercion. It is not a weapon of aggression, but a shield. Political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann challenge the notion that nuclear weapons are useful for extracting concessions. In their book, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, they show that nuclear powers don’t win more disputes than non-nuclear ones. Their conclusion? Nukes are better at preventing war than starting or winning one.
We saw this dynamic in play during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Despite enormous tension, the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides forced the U.S. and USSR to find a diplomatic exit. More recently, a standoff between India and Pakistan after the Indian Parliament attacked with a missile strike on May 7th, 2025, but it never escalated into full war—largely due to both countries possessing nuclear arms.
Power and Fear: Why Nuclear Proliferation Is Opposed
If nuclear weapons deter war, why do powerful nations fear their spread? It’s not just about keeping the world safe. It’s also about maintaining control.
The U.S. and its allies exert enormous pressure on nations that lack nuclear weapons. Iraq (1991, 2003), Serbia (1999), and Libya (2011) serve as cautionary tales: non-nuclear states can be coerced, sanctioned, even overthrown. But once a country possesses nuclear arms, the calculus changes dramatically.
North Korea has endured sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military threats for decades. But it hasn’t been invaded. Its nuclear capability, no matter how limited, acts as a shield.
Ukraine’s story is the inverse. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gave up its nuclear stockpile in exchange for security assurances. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. In 2022, Russia launched a full invasion. The international guarantees, without a nuclear deterrent, proved meaningless.
The Libya Lesson: Disarmament and Regime Change
Perhaps no case illustrates the dangers of disarmament better than Libya. In 2003, Muammar Gaddafi voluntarily dismantled his nuclear program in a bid to normalize relations with the West. Eight years later, he was killed during a NATO-backed uprising.
The signal sent to aspiring nuclear states was clear: give up your program, and you risk annihilation. North Korea cited Libya directly as justification for retaining its weapons. Iranian officials have also made public statements warning against the fate of Gaddafi.
Former U.S. Senator Bob Menendez summed it up with dry understatement: "It didn’t work out too well for Gaddafi."
The JCPOA: A Diplomatic Victory Dismantled
In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed between Iran and the P5+1 (U.S., U.K., France, China, Russia, and Germany). The agreement placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions.
Under the JCPOA:
Iran agreed to cap uranium enrichment at 3.67% (well below weapons-grade levels).
The number of installed centrifuges was reduced by two-thirds.
The IAEA received unprecedented access to inspect Iranian facilities.
By all accounts, the deal worked. The IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran’s compliance.
In 2018, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, calling it “defective at its core.” His administration criticized the deal for failing to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional proxy activities. But behind the rhetoric, the move reflected something else: a refusal to accept a deal that bore President Obama’s name. Pressure from Israel also played a key role.
Since the withdrawal, Iran has resumed enrichment beyond the JCPOA limits, and tensions have steadily escalated.
Proxy Conflicts and the Post-Soviet Vacuum
The Cold War was defined by superpower proxy conflicts, but nuclear deterrence kept direct war off the table. After the Soviet Union collapsed, that stabilizing force vanished. The U.S. emerged as the sole superpower, and military interventions increased.
Without the Soviet deterrent, nations like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria became theaters of conflict. Regional rivalries flared. U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iranian proxy militias, Turkish incursions—conflict metastasized in the absence of great power balance.
The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities follows that same arc. It’s not just about stopping Iran from getting a bomb. It’s about preserving the U.S.'s ability to act without consequence.
Strategic Bombings: Delaying the Inevitable?
Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor and the 2007 strike on Syria’s nuclear facility are often cited as success stories. But they may also be short-term fixes that accelerate long-term problems.
Striking Iranian sites may delay nuclear progress, but they won’t erase the knowledge. Worse, such attacks may unify the Iranian public around a nationalist cause, strengthening the regime’s domestic support. They may also push Iran to go fully underground with its program—harder to track, harder to verify.
Every missile strike reinforces the lesson: if you don’t have a bomb, someone will eventually come for you.
The Role of Ideology: Christian Nationalism and Foreign Policy
There’s an ideological current beneath U.S. foreign policy that often goes unexamined: Christian nationalism.
Christian nationalism fuses conservative evangelical values with American exceptionalism. It portrays the U.S. as a divinely ordained force for good, and casts opponents—especially Islamic nations—as morally inferior threats to be subdued. Groups like Christians United for Israel (CUFI) exert significant influence in Washington and reinforce this binary worldview.
Iran, for its part, operates under its own theocratic ideology. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei holds final say over foreign policy, and clerical legitimacy shapes political power.
When foreign policy is driven by theology rather than strategy, diplomacy suffers. Compromise becomes betrayal. Peace becomes weakness. And war becomes inevitable.
What Can Be Done? A Roadmap to De-escalation
Despite these headwinds, diplomacy is still possible—if pursued intelligently and urgently.
1. Acknowledge the Conflict
As Roger Fisher and William Ury argue in Getting to Yes, negotiation begins with recognizing the other side’s concerns. Iran sees the recent strikes as existential threats. Any talks must begin with acknowledgment of those fears.
2. Reinstate the JCPOA Framework
The 2015 deal worked. Rebuilding it will be hard, but it remains the best non-military path to de-escalation. Any revived deal must include realistic timelines, mutual commitments, and structured incentives.
3. Regional Inclusion
Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Turkey must be part of the conversation. Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory shows that regional balance, not superpower dominance, creates lasting peace.
4. Build Confidence Gradually
Political scientist Charles Osgood’s GRIT framework—Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction—shows how trust can be built through small, reciprocal actions. Think inspections for sanctions relief. Think hotline reactivations. Think real diplomacy.
5. Offer Security Assurances
No deal will stick unless Iran believes regime change is off the table. The U.S. must commit—publicly and credibly—that it won’t pursue military overthrow if Iran complies with its obligations.
Until the Theology Changes
In the long run, peace in the Middle East requires something even more difficult than diplomacy: ideological change.
Theocratic regimes in Iran, nationalist ideologies in Israel, and Christian nationalism in the U.S. all feed a cycle of conflict. These belief systems elevate righteousness over realism and turn negotiations into holy wars.
The Camp David Accords (1978) and the Oslo Accords (1993) succeeded because they were grounded in political realism—not religious zeal. We need leaders willing to return to that model.
Final Thoughts: Peace Through Patience
In the short term, the path is clear:
Withdraw vulnerable U.S. military assets.
Halt further airstrikes.
Resume diplomatic contact through third parties like the EU.
Restore intelligence-sharing mechanisms regionally.
Begin rebuilding the JCPOA, step by verifiable step.
These are not signs of weakness. They are the only rational response to a world where the logic of deterrence is being drowned by ideology and inertia.
Until the deeper ideological alignments change, this is the best path we have.
Because when diplomacy fails, the alternative isn’t victory—it’s fallout.